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Tinkering with Success:       
College Athletes, Social Media and 
the First Amendment 
 
Meg Penrose* 
 
 Good law does not always make good policy. This article 
seeks to provide a legal assessment, not a policy directive. The 
policy choices made by individual institutions and athletic 
departments should be guided by law, but absolutely left to 
institutional discretion. Many articles written on college 
student-athletes’ social media usage attempt to urge policy 
directives clothed in constitutional analysis. 
 In this author’s opinion, these articles have lost 
perspective – constitutional perspective.  This article seeks 
primarily to provide a legal and constitutional assessment so 
that schools and their athletic departments will have ample 
information to then make their own policy choices.  
 
I. Introductory Perspective – To Implicate Is Not to Violate 
 
Just because a regulation implicates the First Amendment 
does not mean that regulation violates the First Amendment.1  
In fact, many of the existing limits, and even season-long bans, 
placed    on    college   athletes’   social   media   usage   are  
 
 * Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law.  Professor 
Penrose, a former Division I scholarship athlete, teaches Constitutional Law, 
Criminal Procedure and First Amendment.  She also litigates in the area of 
First Amendment to protect the speech and expression rights of all 
Americans. She is extremely grateful to Professor Leslie Garfield and the 
Pace Law Review for hosting such a timely, thoughtful and diverse 
Symposium.  The Editorial Board, and student members, of the Pace Law 
Review deserve credit for their hard work and editorial support of all the 
authors participating in this Symposium.   
1. City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803-04 
(1984). 
1
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likely 
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constitutional.2  Do these regulations implicate the First 
Amendment?  Absolutely.  But, do they violate the First 
Amendment?  Most likely not when a proper content-neutral 
time, place and manner assessment is applied.3  Accepting this 
conclusion requires a deeper appreciation and understanding of 
the First Amendment, particularly in the unique context of 
college athletics.4  In candor, accepting this conclusion requires 
perspective. 
When discussing the issue of a college student-athlete’s 
First Amendment rights, it is imperative to appreciate 
perspective.  Many commentators decry any regulations on a 
student-athlete’s speech because they fail to appreciate that 
the goal of athletics is successful athletic performance.  These 
authors admonish schools and coaches, claiming that they 
should be educating their athletes on the proper use and 
handling of social media.  In essence, these authors would 
prefer to have coaches teach their athletes on the finer points of 
social media, something many coaches are ill-equipped to do, 
despite the fact that such lessons take away from the focus on 
training athletes to excel on the court or on the field where the 
focus truly is succeeding in sporting events.  In reality, this 
perspective asks coaches to “take their eye off the ball.”  
 
2. See Meg Penrose, Outspoken: Social Media and the Modern College 
Athlete, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 509 (2013). 
3. See infra Part IV. See also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 
(1941). 
4. See, e.g., Marcum v. Dahl, 658 F.2d 731, 734-35 (10th Cir. 1981) 
(dismissing University of Oklahoma women’s basketball players’ First 
Amendment challenge to the loss of their respective scholarships for 
criticizing the head coach); Williams v. Eaton, 468 F.2d 1079, 1082 (10th Cir. 
1972) (permitting dismissal of several University of Wyoming football team 
members from the team after a dispute regarding the attempt by these team 
members to wear black armbands during a game with Brigham Young 
University to protest racial policies of the Mormon Church); Green v. Sandy, 
No. 5:10-cv-367-JMH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114718, at *16 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 3, 
2011) (finding no violation of a player’s First Amendment right and 
dismissing the player from the soccer team for criticizing the women’s soccer 
coach); Richard v. Perkins, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1219 (D. Kan. 2005) 
(finding no First Amendment violation when the track coach dismissed an 
athlete from the team and no “constitutionally protected property or liberty 
interests in participating in intercollegiate athletics.”). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/2
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Instead of discussing offense, defense and strategy, many of 
these authors believe – erroneously – that coaches should be 
instructing on social media etiquette. 
This “educational” approach ignores the proper role of 
coaches – which is to field a winning team and prepare their 
athletes for fair and successful competition.5  The primary goal 
of college athletics, actually all athletic pursuits, is successful 
athletic performance.  No one shows up to a game or 
tournament hoping or preparing to lose.  No athlete suits up 
hoping to perform in mediocre fashion.  Athletics, by its very 
nature, separates teams and individual athletes into winners 
and losers.  All the hard work, sacrifice and training is endured 
to claim victory, not defeat. 
Articulating this primary goal of successful athletic 
performance does not, however, minimize or discount the 
importance of ensuring, at all times and in all ways, student-
welfare.6  Coaches have a continuing duty to protect their 
athletes and to preserve their physical, mental and emotional 
well-being.  This entire article assumes that college coaches 
and university personnel put student welfare before winning or 
 
5. See Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1190 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(upholding dismissal of college basketball coach for using the “N-word” 
during a locker-room speech to allegedly motivate his players).  In denying 
that Dambrot had any First Amendment or academic freedom protection 
afforded college faculty in the classroom, the Sixth Circuit explained, 
“Dambrot's use of the N-word is even further away from the marketplace of 
ideas and the concept of academic freedom because his position as coach is 
somewhat different from that of the average classroom teacher. Unlike the 
classroom teacher whose primary role is to guide students through the 
discussion and debate of various viewpoints in a particular discipline, 
Dambrot's role as a coach is to train his student athletes how to win on the 
court. The plays and strategies are seldom up for debate. Execution of the 
coach's will is paramount. Moreover, the coach controls who plays and for 
how long, placing a disincentive on any debate with the coach's ideas which 
might have taken place.” Id. 
6. In fact, student welfare may present an entirely separate and 
independent basis for imposing time, place and manner regulations on 
student-athletes’ use of social media, including season long bans.  Because 
the issue of student welfare is enveloped in the current thesis (emphasizing 
winning as the primary goal of athletics presumes student-welfare has been 
preserved in the process), the author will save for another day a longer, more 
extensive treatment of student welfare as an independent basis for 
supporting time, place and manner restrictions on student-athletes’ social 
media usage. 
5
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any other issue relating to athletic performance.  Student 
welfare is a principal goal of the entire NCAA structure,7 which 
limits practice time and seeks to ensure that an athlete 
receives dual protection in their varying roles as a student and 
an athlete.8  The packaging of this legal argument assumes, 
always, that successful athletic performance is being achieved 
– or targeted – only in a manner that protects student welfare 
and an athlete’s well-being.9  The student-athlete’s physical 
and emotional welfare is the paramount concern, or should be, 
of every athletic department.  Thus, this article takes as a 
given that student welfare and protection will always precede 
decisions, both on and off the court, that impact a student 
athlete.   
Accepting that successful athletic performance can be 
accomplished without sacrificing student welfare and well-
 
7. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 2013-2014, NCAA DIVISION I 
MANUAL, CONST. art. 2.2, 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D114.pdf. 
8. Id. at 3. “2.2.3 Health and Safety. It is the responsibility of each 
member institution to protect the health of, and provide a safe environment 
for, each of its participating student-athletes. (Adopted: 1/10/95))[; and] 
2.2.4 Student-Athlete/Coach Relationship.  It is the responsibility of each 
member institution to establish and maintain an environment that fosters a 
positive relationship between the student-athlete and coach.  (Adopted: 
1/10/95)).” Id. 
9. Id. at 4.  
 
2.2.4 The Principle of Sportsmanship and Ethical Conduct, 
For intercollegiate athletics to promote the character 
development of participants, to enhance the integrity of 
higher education and to promote civility in society, student-
athletes, coaches, and all others associated with these 
athletics programs and events should adhere to such 
fundamental values as respect, fairness, civility, honesty 
and responsibility. These values should be manifest not only 
in athletics participation, but also in the broad spectrum of 
activities affecting the athletics program. It is the 
responsibility of each institution to: (Revised: 1/9/96) (a) 
Establish policies for sportsmanship and ethical conduct in 
intercollegiate athletics consistent with the educational 
mission and goals of the institution; and (Adopted: 
1/9/96)[,] (b) Educate, on a continuing basis, all 
constituencies about the policies in Constitution 2.4-(a). 
(Adopted: 1/9/96)[.]  
Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/2
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being, one returns to the primary goal of college athletics.  No 
school seeks to field a losing team, and few fans enjoy following 
marginally competitive teams.10  America loves winners.  And, 
Americans love their college athletes.11  But, as we enter the 
realm of athletic speech, it becomes critical to honestly embrace 
each of our perspectives to fully appreciate our respective 
constitutional biases. 
If an individual argues for the so-called rights of college 
athletes to use social media without regulation, is she 
espousing that “right” for their benefit or hers?  Does that 
individual really want her favorite athlete to be tweeting about 
his or her college experience while she is preparing for an 
important game or tournament?  And, are they following the 
student-athlete in their student capacities (craving information 
about their classwork, their laboratories, their thesis and 
writing or a change in major) or wanting to hear about the 
exploits of an 18- to 23-year-old living the athletic dream of 
playing football for Texas A&M or Notre Dame or playing 
basketball for Duke or Kansas?  The truth is probably that 
most fans, a term derived from the word “fanatic,” are far more 
interested in the college athlete’s life as an athlete, with little 
to no interest in their educational pursuits.12  Ours is quickly 
 
10. Blair Browning & Jimmy Sanderson, The Positives and Negatives of 
Twitter: Exploring How Student Athletes Use Twitter and Respond to Critical 
Tweets, 5 INT’L J. SPORTS COMM. 503, 506 (2012). “For many people, sports 
fandom is a significant component of their social identity (Trujillo & Krizek, 
1994; Wann, Royalty, & Roberts, 2000). This identity, grounded in 
attachments to teams and athletes, can provoke maladaptive behaviors 
(Wakefield & Wann, 2006), particularly if athletes or teams do not meet fans’ 
expectations.” Id. 
11. Id. “One reason for Twitter’s popularity is the increased access it 
gives fans to athletes and sports figures (Sanderson, 2011a, 2013). While this 
enhanced immediacy can be positive, it brings with it problems, particularly 
for student-athletes.” Id. 
12. Cf., Bruce Feldman, Social-Media Savvy Grows, Even as Coaches, 
Schools Try to Keep Up, CBSSPORTS.COM (Mar. 13, 2012, 4:29 PM), 
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/story/17771677/socialmedia-savvy-
grows-even-as-coaches-schools-try-to-keep-up. Feldman aptly describes the 
problem:  
 
The level of celebrity for college athletes has never extended 
further than it does these days. The reason? Start with 
significantly more TV coverage and 24-hour, wall-to-wall 
7
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becoming a TMZ-focused society, one that relishes the next 
outrageous story involving an athlete or entertainer. 
For those schooled in constitutional rights, it should be 
clear that student-athletes are far more regulated than their 
traditional college counterparts.13  Student-athletes wear two 
separate hats – one as a student, where robust First 
Amendment rights remain,14 and another as an athlete, where 
speech and expression rights have long been regulated by 
coaches, athletic departments and even athletic conferences. 
Courts analyzing social media regulations on college-athletes 
will likely appreciate these distinctions as they have in the 
past.15  And, if coaches and athletic programs continue to 
impose time, place and manner regulations (such as no 
Facebook or Twitter during season or before, after and during 
athletic contests) that are content-neutral, these regulations 
are far more likely to pass constitutional muster than those 
that target particular words and phrases using policing 
software programs, as content-based regulations receive higher 
constitutional scrutiny.  Further, recent legislative attempts to 
prevent coaches or other school officials from monitoring their 
 
media while the definition of “media” continues to morph 
into something much different in recent years, mirroring the 
often-contorted modern-day definition of celebrity. In 
football, kids become commodities and get famous before 
they sign with a college as worshipping fan bases and 
obsessed media hang on their every move. Add in a level of 
unprecedented accessibility to these players and it’s a 
combustible mix.  
Id. 
13. See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting 
the well-established fact that “student athletes are subject to more 
restrictions than the student body at large. . . .”). 
14. Cf., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).  The Supreme 
Court helped explain this distinction somewhat in a different context in 
Keyishian: “The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The 
Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that 
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, 
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.’ United States v. 
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372.” Id. at 603. 
15. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 658 (Cal. 1994) 
(noting that intercollegiate athletes are subjected to “special regulation of 
sleep habits, diet, fitness, and other activities that intrude significantly on 
privacy interests . . . not shared by other students or the population at 
large.”). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/2
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student-athletes’ social media, while passed with good 
intentions, actually forces programs to choose either to ban or 
limit their athletes’ social media usage under time, place and 
manner analysis, or forego any regulation and risk team 
disruption or athletic fallout from errant social media 
postings.16  Coaches literally must decide how important 
Facebook and Twitter are in relation to athletic performance. 
Just because a regulation implicates the First Amendment 
does not mean that regulation violates the First Amendment.17  
As the Supreme Court observed in City Council of Los Angeles 
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, even complete bans on speech may be 
constitutionally permissible.18  Writing for the Court, Justice 
Stevens reminded: 
 
The ordinance prohibits appellees from 
communicating with the public in a certain 
manner, and presumably diminishes the total 
quantity of their communication in the City.  The 
application of the ordinance to appellees’ 
expressive activities surely raises the question 
whether the ordinance abridges their “freedom of 
speech” within the meaning of the First 
Amendment, and appellees certainly have 
standing to challenge the application of the 
ordinance to their own expressive activities. “But 
to say the ordinance presents a First Amendment 
issue is not necessarily to say that it constitutes 
 
16. See, e.g., Pam Greenberg, Employer Access to Social Media 
Usernames and Passwords, NAT. CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 17, 2013), 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/employer-access-to-social-media-
passwords.aspx (listing six states that have enacted legislation and fourteen 
states that have introduced legislation restricting employers or educators 
from requesting access to social networking sites of employees and students). 
See also CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 99120–22 (Deering 2012) (prohibiting 
educational institutions in California from requesting access to student social 
media accounts, asking for associated usernames or passwords, giving 
information from such networks, or punishing students for failing to give 
such information, if asked). 
17. City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803-04 
(1984). 
18. Id. 
9
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a First Amendment violation.” Metromedia, Inc. 
v. San Diego, 453 U.S. at 561 (Burger C. J., 
dissenting). It has been clear since this Court’s 
earliest decisions concerning the freedom of 
speech that the state may sometimes curtail 
speech when necessary to advance a significant 
and legitimate state interest. Schenck v. United 
States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919).19 
 
The failure of many fans, and even scholars, to appreciate 
this distinction is understandable.  But, my guess is that the 
many voices claiming social media regulations on college 
athletes “violate” the First Amendment are based on 
perspective – their perspectives – which may not always be a 
proper legal, much less constitutionally-supported, perspective.  
Of course the fan wants greater access to the athlete and the 
locker room.  The fan wants to be in the athlete’s head when he 
faces that last second field goal or she is at the free-throw line 
with the game on the line.  The fan wants to know, “What are 
they thinking?  What motivates them?”  But, the Constitution 
does not necessarily require that a coach permit such 
unfettered access. 
The coach’s job is to train that student-athlete to make the 
field goal and convert those free-throws.  The coach’s job is to 
provide opportunities for the student athlete to excel 
athletically.  In contrast, the teacher’s job is to educate.  And, 
while coaches teach important life skills, my sense is that 
courts will not impose on coaches the line of cases focused on 
classroom speech and expression but rather will analyze the 
issue of purely athletic speech through the lens of sport where 
athletic performance is the primary focus.  Successful athletic 
performance – at least for the coach and athlete – is probably 
more important than robust First Amendment rights in a 
locker room on or the pitch.  To the athlete, athletic success is 
more important than unfettered Facebook or Twitter access.  
Or, at least this is the preference demonstrated by most college 
 
19. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/2
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athletes.20 
II.  Further Perspective – First Amendment Lawyer, Former 
College Athlete 
 
I am a former Division I college athlete.  In fact, I left 
college with absolutely no debt because my athletic skills, 
though far exceeded by my college teammates, enabled me to 
obtain five years of fully-funded educational opportunity.  For 
four years, I played guard on the Women’s Basketball team.  I 
rarely started and was far from an extraordinary college 
athlete.  My coach once remarked she wished she could put my 
“heart and desire into one of [her] more talented athletes.”  
This is what many consider a back-handed compliment.  
Knowing my coach, she meant exactly what she said, but 
meant absolutely no disrespect.  She spoke the truth.  Her 
comment gave me perspective, important perspective – I had 
reached my athletic pinnacle, at least in basketball, in high 
school. 
Following my fourth year as a player, I was privileged to 
stay on as a Graduate Assistant Coach for the Women’s 
Basketball team.  This experience gave me further, but very 
different, perspective.  Not only was I able to experience 
Division I athletics and all that it entails as a player, but I was 
also given a small glimpse into the many issues facing coaches 
whose careers literally hang on the judgment of 18- to 23-year-
olds, many of whom are living away from home for the first 
 
20. Chris Fuhrmeister, Clemson Bans Football Players From Twitter 
(And Players Don’t Mind), SB NATION, (Aug. 1, 2013 4:36 PM), 
http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2013/8/1/4579944/clemson-football-
players-twitter.  Apparently, Clemson – like many other programs – chose to 
ban Twitter during season to enable its players to focus on football.  As the 
athletes signed off from Twitter, many appreciated it was time to get down to 
the business of football.  Representative tweets include:  “Alright twitter, 
time to do work. I'll be back in January.” Id. (quoting tweet from Chandler 
Catanzaro); “It's time to hop in the football season submarine. See you next 
year.” Id. (quoting tweet from Ronnie Geohaghan Jr.); “Alright twitter it's 
been real. Time to get this job. Next thing I tweet will be after the BCS 
championship[.]” Id. (quoting tweet from Jordan Legget); and, “Because we 
are all in[.]”  Id. (quoting tweet from D. O’Daniel). College athletes, whose 
conduct has been strictly regulated since childhood, appreciate that coaches 
have rules that help players focus on their sport.  Twitter bans appear to fall 
in this realm, at least for athletes. 
11
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time.  Coaching is not nearly as glamorous as it appears. 
Playing college athletics was exhilarating, culminating a 
young life spent practicing and preparing for Division I 
competition.  Prior to age 22, everything in my life centered on 
basketball and athletics.  If I was not practicing, training, 
running or studying basketball, I was dreaming of my 
opportunity to take that last second shot, make that last free 
throw.  Playing was about performing and succeeding on the 
court.  Coaching, in contrast, showed me how often the 
judgment of 18- to 23-year-olds is colored by their limited life 
experience.  If athletic performance and success is all that 
matters to an 18- to 23-year-old, that individual most likely 
lacks perspective.  I know I did.  I know my teammates did.  I 
know my sister, who played Division I volleyball, did.  I know 
my brothers-in-law, who played Division I basketball and 
football, did.  We all did, until we spent time coaching. 
Coaching gives an entirely different perspective.  Coaching 
focuses on team first, individual second.  Coaching emphasizes 
team performance and ensuring that team chemistry remains 
viable and effective.  The goal of a coach is to keep several 
individuals with vastly different personalities focused on a 
unitary goal – winning.  The goal of a player is, in contrast and 
generally speaking, to further their individual talents in a 
particular athletic endeavor.  The goals of coaches and players 
overlap, but they are not identical.  The perspective of coaches 
and their athletes, likewise, are often worlds apart. 
Another perspective that is increasingly being expressed is 
the fan’s perspective.  Twenty-first century fans seek, if not 
demand, greater and greater access to their favorite players.  
Social media, be it Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, or Pinterest, 
enables fans to gain immediate access to their favorite players 
to support, taunt, laud or criticize them.  And, in a culture 
where athletes are some of the most revered individuals in 
society, such access is highly desired.  TMZ and social media 
have blurred the fan’s perspective from simply rooting for his 
or her favorite team into demanding greater access into their 
favorite player’s world – the world of an 18- to 23-year-old 
college student.  Thus, it is not uncommon in my experience to 
see fans raise First Amendment concerns on the behalf of 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/2
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college athletes when those fans want unlimited 24/7 access to 
their favorite player.  “It is their right,” has become a common 
refrain of fans. 
While I am a fan, I am also a fan that appreciates and 
studies the law.  And, my legal education has given me yet 
another, distinct perspective.  When I completed college, my 
lack of debt enabled me to attend graduate school.  I still 
consider my five years of paid education the greatest perk of 
having played college basketball. Having learned discipline, 
dedication and perseverance during athletics, law school 
became a natural fit.  Reading cases for hours, studying legal 
theory, appreciating the limits of government and law, I came 
to appreciate that the law is not nearly as neat or as clean as 
many perceive.  Law is as complicated as any offensive or 
defensive scheme known in athletics.  Law is as fluid as any 
athletic contest with stakes often higher than playing for a 
national championship.  The law is amazing but its proper 
application requires perspective.  So, I learned.  I studied.  As 
an athlete I was trained to win and always eager to compete.  
So, I competed.  I trained my mind.  I looked at all angles of the 
law tirelessly.  I refused to quit.  And, ultimately, I excelled, 
due largely to the lessons taught during athletic competition.  
The tenacity I exerted in law school had been honed many 
years before in athletics. 
Eventually, I became a law professor.  I continue to train 
my mind, learning and studying, all the while gaining 
additional perspective as a teacher of law.  Every day, I am 
coaching the brightest and most talented individuals to become 
lawyers – to “succeed” at law school to “perform” as lawyers.  I 
try to build character.  I try to instill discipline, focus and, yes, 
even teamwork.  Law, much like athletics, requires 
collaboration to successfully perform.  And, law, much like 
athletics, is usually about winning. 
This article seeks to offer my legal perspective on the 
intersection of college athletes, social media and the First 
Amendment.  I gained this perspective having played athletics, 
having coached athletes, and having taught and continuing to 
teach law students.  My legal perspective may not be popular 
among fans, deferring to coaches and athletic departments in 
13
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their goal to train athletes to be good citizens and effective 
players.  My legal assessment grants coaches and athletic 
departments more latitude to decide what, if any, limits should 
be placed on their student-athletes’ social media usage.  The 
policy choice, under my legal analysis, is left to coaches and 
institutions even as fans champion their favorite college 
athletes’ First Amendment rights. 
My perspective is undoubtedly colored by my training as 
an athlete, my brief experience as a coach, and my nearly two 
decades spent as a lawyer and, ultimately, a law professor.  
You may not agree with me.  You may not embrace what I have 
to say.  But, my comments should be kept in their proper 
perspective.  I am not arguing policy.  I am not favoring a 
particular choice that should be made.  I am analyzing law. 
I was an athlete first.  I have experienced life at the 
Division I level being placed under a coach’s restrictions.  I 
have endured playing, losing, winning, taunting, cheering, 
advising and endless coaching.  I have seen this issue from 
inside – which gives me a unique perspective – one, 
unfortunately, shared by very few fans and even fewer judges. 
To me, the question of social media usage is not merely 
theoretical.  The issue is both pragmatic and personal.  Are 
fans really in the best position to argue for the free speech 
rights of their favorite athletes?  And, in doing so, are these 
fans really doing the athletes a favor or a disservice?  Most 
importantly, are fans urging these “rights” to serve the best 
interests of the athletes or themselves? 
Many, many blogs and articles boldly proclaim that social 
media bans violate a college athlete’s First Amendment 
rights.21  As Lee Corso has so often admonished, “[n]ot so fast 
my friend.”  True, the First Amendment is often implicated by 
restrictions on speech.  But, implicating the First Amendment 
is not the same as violating the First Amendment.22  And, as I 
 
21. See, e.g., J. Wes Gay, Hands Off Twitter:  Are NCAA Student-Athlete 
Social Media Bans Unconstitutional?, 39 FLA. STATE L. REV. 781 (2012).  See 
also, Eric Bentley, He Tweeted What? A First Amendment Analysis of the Use 
of Social Media by College Athletes and Recommended Best Practices, 38 J. 
COLL. & UNIV. L. 451 (2012). 
22. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 803-04. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/2
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continue to assert, coaches and athletic departments likely 
have the legal – no, the Constitutional – right to limit their 
athletes’ access to social media.  You have the First 
Amendment right to disagree with my conclusions.  I hope as 
you do so, you will consider the influences of your own training, 
your own experiences and your own perspective.  Are you a 
former college athlete?  Are you an attorney, with an emphasis 
in First Amendment?  Or, are you a fan – someone interested 
in getting to know your favorite college athlete better through 
social media?  Your perspective, like mine, probably colors your 
opinion. 
Athletes are trained to focus on successful athletic 
performance and the discipline it takes to win.  We are taught 
to sacrifice for the sake of the team, the university.  Athletes 
have given years to training, made sacrifices, and have 
endured rules and regulations that may seem odd to those 
outside athletics.  But, athletes willingly forgo a traditional 
college experience for the amazing opportunity to compete and 
represent an institution’s athletic department.  Athletes are 
taught to keep our focus – on and off the court, on and off the 
field.  We often do things that are uncomfortable for others and 
do so knowing that our team, and university, will benefit from 
our sacrifices. 
Athletics is, in the end, truly about successful performance.  
And, while we expect our coaches to train athletes how to be 
good citizens, not merely good players, coaches, players and 
teams are judged by their performances, not their speech or 
expressive activity.  The omnipresent nature of social media 
undoubtedly complicates this equation.23  The First 
Amendment does not.  Coaches have the constitutional right to 
limit their athletes’ speech and do so on a regular basis.  This is 
 
23. See, e.g., Adam Hughes, Purdue Basketball Twitter Ban: Fan 
Reaction, YAHOO! SPORTS (Oct. 17, 2011), 
http://sports.yahoo.com/top/news?slug=ycn-10229161. As Hughes explains: 
“While fans may enjoy [the athletes’] antics, they do little to shed a flattering 
light on a university or its programs, so it’s not hard to understand [the 
coach’s] hesitancy to let his players hit the Web. Add in the fact that these 
are young men who don’t always show the best judgment, and it’s not far-
fetched to imagine one or more of them revealing some tidbit or other that 
would amount to a tactical advantage for their opponents . . . .” Id. 
15
  
2014 TINKERING WITH SUCCESS 43 
 
nothing new.  This is nothing remarkable.  And, it is certainly 
nothing that has historically been seen as violating the First 
Amendment. 
Does a coach’s decision to limit his or her student-athlete’s 
access to social media implicate the First Amendment?  Yes, it 
does.  But that is not the ultimate question.  Rather, the 
question is whether such limits violate the First Amendment.  
Contrary to many other commentators, I believe these limits – 
regardless of their wisdom from a policy perspective – are 
constitutional content-neutral limitations permitted under 
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions. 
 
III. The Important Perspective – The Heavily Regulated World 
of College Athletics 
 
College athletes are generally the most regulated students 
on campus.24  Athletes often are required to report to campus 
long before classes begin, must pass a physical in order to 
enroll in an athletics class, and often must maintain a 
particular grade point average to remain on the team.25  They 
must attend study hall, have access to unique tutors and 
tutoring26 and find themselves traveling the country, if not the 
world, in pursuit of athletic competition.27  Some of the 
regulations imposed on athletes come directly from the NCAA, 
including requirements that an athlete maintain a continued 
 
24. See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir. 2007). 
25. See, Jeff Stone, A Hidden Toxicity in the Term “Student-Athlete”:  
Stereotype Threat for Athletes in the College Classroom, 2 LAW & POL’Y J. 179, 
179 (2012) (observing that NCAA regulations mandate college athletes 
“enroll in at least twelve semester units, declare a major, maintain a 
cumulative grade-point-average of 1.8 or higher, and make academic progress 
toward a degree.”).  Id. 
26. The Value of College Sports, NCAA.ORG, 
http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/value-college-sports (last visited Apr. 
12, 2015) (explaining that college athletes “receive academic support, such as 
state-of-the-art technology and tutoring, and have access to athlete-focused 
academic advisors in addition to traditional academic advisors.”). 
27. See e.g., Michael Braun, Finding A Balance: College Student 
Athletes, HASHTAGS (April 23, 2013), http://sites.jmu.edu/103molloy/finding-a-
balance-college-student-athletes/ (describing the differing experiences of four 
interviewed college athletes). 
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level of progress toward a degree, while others come directly 
from the athletic department or a coach.28  But, college athletes 
face a myriad of regulations that more traditional college 
students do not. 
Many college athletes are prohibited from smoking, 
drinking (even if legally of age), staying out all night, going 
home during Thanksgiving, Christmas or spring break.29  The 
traditional college experience is not one shared by the college 
athlete.  College athletes are randomly subjected to drug 
tests.30  College students, unfortunately, often experiment with 
drugs and, unless arrested, face no consequences for doing so.  
A college athlete’s career could end, and scholarship 
withdrawn, with such experimentation.  College athletes are 
often required to submit attendance reports to coaches or 
tutors while their more traditional college roommate sleeps the 
day away.  College athletes are often required to attend team 
meetings, study film and avoid classes that conflict with their 
practice or game schedules.31  Their majors may be impacted by 
their sport and their sport’s travel schedule.  College athletes 
 
28. Student-Athletes: Dress Code, in SOUTH CAROLINA STUDENT-ATHLETE 
CODE OF CONDUCT HANDBOOK.  When traveling, male members of the South 
Carolina athletic program are to “refrain from wearing earrings” and female 
athletes are expected to “wear a dress, skirt, or dress slacks.”  These 
regulations are based on the fact that “[s]tudent-athletes are public 
representatives of the University of South Carolina both on and off the field.” 
29. See, e.g., University of Delaware Student-Athlete Code of Conduct 
Form, in UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE STUDENT-ATHLETE CODE OF CONDUCT 
HANDBOOK (requiring athlete signature) (proscribing “[t]he use and 
possession of drugs, tobacco, alcohol . . . are strictly prohibited while an 
individual is a student-athlete at UD”). 
30. One of the more recent examples occurred in the first NCAA College 
Football National Championship game in January, 2015.  One of Oregon 
University’s wide receivers, Darren Carrington, was disqualified from 
participating in the national championship game due to failing an NCAA-
sanctioned drug test.  ESPN indicated that multiple reports confirm 
Carrington tested positive for marijuana.  Unlike traditional college students 
who are not subjected to random drug tests, college athletes can lose 
numerous benefits, and face athletic sanctions, under such mandatory, 
randomly administered tests.  See Brett McMurphy, Darren Carrington 
Ruled Ineligible, ESPN (Jan. 10, 2015), http://espn.go.com/college-
football/bowls14/story/_/id/12145339/darren-carrington-oregon-ducks-
ineligible-national-championship-mark-helfrich-says. 
31. Madelaine Jerousek-Smith, Remarkable Students, Remarkable 
Athletes, 50 Parent Times Online 2 (2006). 
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may be expected to take summer school and winter intercession 
classes to open up their academic schedule for more early 
morning workouts or game-related travel.32  The schedules of 
college athletes are not theirs to choose.  Rather, that schedule 
is influenced, if not chosen, by someone else whose focus in on 
the unique demands of college studies on the student-athlete.33 
Thus, the life of a college athlete is heavily regulated.  
Athletes both expect and accept this fact.  Fans, unfamiliar 
with the demands of Division I competition, may properly think 
that time spent off the court or away from the field should be 
entirely the student athlete’s time.  But, that impression is a 
far cry from an athlete’s reality.  College athletes have 
schedules that are far from their own – often including team 
meals, NCAA required training sessions, volunteer activities 
required by the team or athletic department. 
Athletes learn at a very early age that weekends are spent 
in competition and weekdays are spent practicing.  Those that 
want to blend in with the general population often find 
themselves blending right out of college athletics.  Division I 
athletes must be disciplined, regimented and willing to 
sacrifice for their team and sport.  I do not say this as a 
dictatorial mandate but rather as a fact of what is required to 
succeed and play at the highest level.  Athletes accept they will 
surrender part of their college experience in exchange for 
participating on a team.  Athletes expect to be given a list of 
“team rules.”  The inclusion of rules relating to speech and 
conduct are something that the athlete will have faced many, 
many times before – from penalties for taunting and excessive 
celebration to personal fouls for cursing or inappropriate 
language.  Athletes live in a world that is heavily structured 
and regulated from day one, beginning at the earliest age.  The 
Constitutional equation assessing the First Amendment rights 
of college athletes, similar to those addressing search and 
 
32. Id. 
33. Andrew Rhim, The Special Relationship Between Student-Athletes 
and Colleges:  An Analysis of a Heightened Duty of Care for the Injuries of 
Student-Athletes, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 329, 338 (1996) (contending that 
“some [student-athletes] will never look over course descriptions or 
educational requirements.  Rather, academic courseloads and concentrations 
of study are determined by assistant coaches in charge of academics.”). 
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seizure, will undoubtedly turn on this heavily regulated 
atmosphere. 
If existing case law serves as a harbinger in this area, the 
Constitution will tolerate more regulation of a college athlete 
than a traditional college student.34  Athletes are, quite 
literally, special and different.  While many focus on the 
regulations imposed upon athletes, one must not forget the 
many perks that flow directly to athletes as a result of their 
participation.  For every Thanksgiving dinner I missed in 
college due to playing in a basketball tournament, I received 
the opportunity to travel this amazing country – from 
Manhattan, Kansas, to Manhattan, New York.  For every 
Christmas or winter break that I was on campus alone with my 
teammates working toward a winning season, I was rewarded 
with funds for my books, labs and tuition.  We were in our 
dorms and apartments studying offenses and defenses in our 
school-issued gear, wearing top-of-the-line shoes, while our 
colleagues were out drinking and watching movies.  I watched 
film, studying offenses and defenses, then walked to study hall 
where I refocused on Edgar Allen Poe, Nathanial Hawthorne 
and English History.  I had early morning practice, class, then 
more practice. But, I was well-fed, well-traveled and well-
regarded.  I was a student-athlete but my roles as student and 
athlete were always distinct and distinguishable. 
At practice I was an athlete, expected to focus my time and 
talents on basketball.  In the classroom I was a student, 
expected to appreciate the finer points of mathematical 
equations or governmental structures.  I passed balls to my 
teammates as an athlete and passed exams in class as a 
student.  The verbs may be the same, but the law should not 
treat these experiences as equivalent in any regard.  The 
athlete’s role and rights are distinct from the student’s. 
As an athlete, I learned lessons that transcended the 
classrooms of my incredible professors.  I learned to sacrifice 
 
34. See, e.g., Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 771 (8th 
Cir. 2001) (observing that “an educational environment conducive to learning 
team unity and sportsmanship and free from disruptions and distractions 
that could hurt or stray the cohesiveness of the team” permit greater 
limitation on a student-athlete’s First Amendment rights). 
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self for others so that our team could collectively pursue 
victory.  I learned to work with people on the court that I 
avoided off the court because we shared a common goal.  They 
were my teammates and we fought together.  I learned the 
harder you work, the more you sacrifice, the more you can 
achieve.  My life was bound up in basketball more than any 
other part of the college experience.  And, this was at a smaller 
Division I college – not a Texas A&M, Notre Dame, Duke or 
Kansas. 
The truth is college athletes are special and different.  As 
student-athletes they have special tutors, special dining halls 
and team meals, special travel, special gear unique to each 
athletic team, special facilities and quiet study places for 
athletes only, special nutritional and training opportunities.  
Thus, it should not at all be controversial that the law would 
treat these individuals in a special and different manner. 
Coaches understandably seek to limit their athletes’ social 
media usage because the light shines far brighter on the college 
athlete than the traditional college student.35  If a regular 
 
35. Bob Wolfley, After Loss to Badgers, Iowa’s Zach McCabe Tweets His 
Anger, Prompting Fran McCaffery to Ban Twitter, J. SENTINEL (Feb. 25, 
2014), http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/sports/247135701.html.  The Iowa 
Hawkeyes Men’s Basketball team provides one such example. Following a 
tough loss on February 22nd, Zach McCabe lashed out on his Twitter account 
at 2:49 p.m. as follows: “The fact that I have iowa fans saying shit me (sic) is 
insane . . . You fans suck . . . Suck a fat one all of you.” Id. (quoting tweet 
from Zach McCabe). As in nearly every other Twitter fiasco, the Tweet was 
immediately deleted (but not before several people captured screen shots to 
keep the tweet in perpetuity), McCabe cancelled his Twitter account and then 
his coach placed a Twitter ban on the entire team; Iowa Coach McCaffery 
Tells Players to Get Off Twitter, FOX SPORTS (Feb 24, 2014), 
http://msn.foxsports.com/college-basketball/story/iowa-fran-mccaffery-tells-
players-to-get-off-twitter1-022414. In a February 24, 2014, story on Fox 
Sports, the following story appeared: 
 
Iowa coach Fran McCaffery has instructed the Hawkeyes to 
shut down their Twitter accounts for the rest of the season 
after senior Zach McCabe exchanged barbs with detractors 
on the social media service.  McCabe air-balled a 3-pointer 
that could have tied the game with 16 seconds left against 
Wisconsin on Saturday. The 20th-ranked Hawkeyes went on 
to lose 79-74. McCabe responded to negative comments 
directed at him on Twitter by lashing out at his critics after 
the game. McCabe deleted the post and apologized.  
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student makes a racist or homophobic comment, chances are it 
will not make the evening news, be reported perpetually on 
ESPN or announced nationally through USA Today.  But, have 
a standout wide-receiver or a starting point guard make a 
boneheaded comment or give away information about their or a 
teammate’s injury status and a team can find itself focusing on 
public relations issues rather than offense or defense.36  One 
commentator even remarked the media waits, eagerly, for a 
public debacle.37  Unfettered social media usage lends itself to 
disrupting team chemistry and team performance.38  And, as 
 
McCaffery says his overall impressions of social media are 
negative and that he'd prefer his players keep their focus on 
Iowa's upcoming games. He said his players are free to 
resume tweeting once the season is over. 
Id.  
 Coach McCaffery’s in-season ban is precisely the type of ban likely to pass 
constitutional muster.  The point of this ban is directly related to his team’s 
on-court success and is not based on particular viewpoint or content.  All 
Twitter feeds will be banned.  Thus, this and similar in-season bans should 
easily survive as a content-neutral time, place and manner restriction 
analysis. 
36. See Hughes, supra note 23. 
37. Gregg Doyel, Coaches’ Twitter Ban Isn’t Stunting Players, It’s 
Protecting Them, CBSSPORTS.COM (Aug. 9, 2011), 
http://www.cbssports.com/columns/story/15416882 (In an incredibly candid 
moment, Doyle explained: “If a college athlete says the wrong thing on 
Twitter, people like me are going to hear about [it]. We’re going to talk about 
it on the radio and write about it in the newspaper or on the Internet. By the 
time we’re finished, the player’s name will be in shambles and his coach will 
be performing damage control. As for us, we leave the wreckage in our rear-
view and move on to the next guy.”). 
38. Dave Southorn, Two Years Later, Petersen Happy with Twitter Ban, 
IDAHO PRESS-TRIBUNE (Sept. 12, 2012, 12:39 PM), 
http://www.idahopress.com/blogs/sports/dave/two-years-later-petersen-happy-
with-twitter-ban/article_1f0dc592-fd09-11e1-9b5b-001a4bcf887a.html 
(responding to questions about his decision to ban Twitter, Coach Peterson 
stated, “‘I’m glad we do it . . . . It just serves no purpose, in my opinion, for 
what we’re trying to do here. It’s just distracting.’”). Id. See also, Greg 
Wallace, Clemson Twitter Ban Raises Questions of Education, Abuse, ORANGE 
& WHITE (Aug. 10, 2012, 6:40 PM), 
http://www.orangeandwhite.com/news/2012/aug/10/clemson-twitter-ban-
raises-questions-education-abu/ (“Clemson coach Dabo Swinney says the ban 
is a matter of keeping his players’ minds focused on the field.”). Coach 
Swinney further underscored that “[Y]ou take an 18, 22 year old young 
person who’s got 30,000 followers, and it’s just one more distraction, one more 
thing, one more obligation . . . [, and w]e’re not going to participate in that 
throughout the season.” Phil Chardis, Men’s Basketball Notes: Social Media 
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such disruption runs counter to the main goal of athletics – 
successful athletic performance – chances are that courts will 
provide coaches with greater latitude than traditional college 
professors.39 
Equally problematic are the fragile egos and psyches of 18- 
to 23-year-old athletes.  These individuals have sacrificed their 
entire lives to reach the college level and in an instant a 
hateful comment from someone outside the team, outside the 
program, can shred an athlete’s confidence.40  Tragically, there 
 
Another Issue for Coaches, JOURNALINQUIRER.COM (Jan. 7, 2011, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.journalinquirer.com/sports/men-s-basketball-notes-social-media-
another-issue-for-coaches/article_8a6e4e70-d915-5f1e-aa4a-
16fb4dcd4abd.html. Coach Steve Lavin, like many other coaches who have 
banned social media, spoke of the distractions that social media causes as the 
rationale for his “during the season” ban. Heather Dinich, Twitter Ban Good 
Move by Jimbo Fisher, ESPN COLLEGE FOOTBALL (July 26, 2012, 2:00 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/blog/acc/post/_/id/41280/twitter-ban-good-move-by-jimbo-
fisher (noting that Coach Fisher considers Twitter “clutter.”). Fisher defends 
his policy by noting that, “[I]t’s a lot easier when there are less distractions.” 
Id.  It is interesting to note that once Twitter was banned at Florida State, 
the team won a national championship one year later.  Focus, it appears, may 
be relevant to athletic success. 
39. Browning & Sanderson, supra note 10, at 509-11 (explaining the 
endemic, obsessive nature of Twitter among college athletes).  Professors 
Browning and Sanderson spoke of athletes admitting they checked Twitter 
during games, despite rules barring such use and noted the image/ego issues 
that Twitter accounts encourage. Id. at 511.  The pair detailed their empirical 
research as follows: “Participants reported having used Twitter for as little as 
5 1/2 months and for as long as 4 years (M = 18 months). They reported 
having Twitter followers ranging from as few as 100 to 18,263 (M = 3,207). 
Participants reported checking Twitter frequently throughout the day, 
ranging from 20 to hundreds of times each day (these student-athletes shared 
that they configured Twitter to alert them each time they were mentioned or 
that they would simply look at their phone every few minutes). All student-
athletes stated they accessed Twitter on their cellular phone due to 
convenience, and they stated that only in the rarest of cases would they 
access Twitter via a computer.” Id. at 509. And, while the Browning & 
Sanderson study was limited to a small pool of student athletes, there is no 
reason to think that their findings diverge in any manner from other 
similarly situation college athletes. 
40. Id. at 516 (“‘Student-athletes’ being ripe candidates for criticism is 
nothing new, but two things that appear to be escalating are the boldness of 
the critics and the immediacy of their messages. Twitter’s rise has been 
accompanied by what appears, at least anecdotally, to be a hypercritical 
society in which people seem to feel empowered to send very demeaning or 
condemning messages to student-athletes via Twitter.  This brazen 
confidence stems from the protection users have behind the phone or 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/2
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are so many examples they are difficult to catalogue.41  But, 
Professors Browning and Sanderson do a nice job of 
summarizing the injury (and distraction) that Twitter causes 
on the emotional level for college athletes: 
 
While hate mail has always been around, 
Twitter has exponentially increased the ease 
with which such messages reach athletes. In fact, 
only 2 of the 20 student athletes [in the 
Professor’s study] reported having their Twitter 
accounts private. Essentially, this means that 18 
of the 20 participants have their Twitter 
accounts set up in a way that enables anyone 
who wishes to follow them to do so and, as such, 
have access to anything that they tweet. Unlike 
Facebook, where users have to agree to be 
friends, Twitter does not necessitate this step 
unless a user specifically configures the account 
to review follower requests. Furthermore, one 
does not even have to follow a person to send 
them a tweet. After a game, as long as an 
individual knows the Twitter handle of the 
athlete they want to contact, they can send a 
tweet that the athlete will likely view. As noted 
in the results, student-athletes are anxious to see 
 
computer screen. Indeed, while many users list their real names, plenty hide 
behind the security of anonymity when sending critical tweets.”). 
41. Cindy Boren, Alabama-Auburn: Death Threats for Kicker After 
Classic Iron Bowl, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/early-lead/wp/2013/12/02/alabama-
auburn-death-threats-for-kicker-after-a-classic-iron-bowl-video/; David 
Jackson, Bush Sends Condolence Letter to Alabama Kicker, USA TODAY (Dec. 
12, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2013/12/12/bush-alabama-
cade-foster-kicker-auburn/3995969/. Perhaps the most notorious episode 
involved the Alabama place kicker, Cade Foster.  In a difficult loss to Auburn 
during the 2014 college football season, Foster missed three field goals of 
varying lengths.  Thereafter, in an attempt to win the game, a substitute 
place kicker was sent in to try a last second field goal.  Many remember the 
epic touchdown run-back of Chris Davis, the Auburn player, when the 
substitute kicker, Adam Griffith, missed a 57-yard field goal attempt. 
Alabama lost the game and Foster immediately began receiving vulgar, 
despicable tweets – including death threats. 
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what people are saying about the game and 
quickly look up their own messages but also 
search their names on Twitter. Thus, even if 
other Twitter users do not explicitly send an 
athlete a message, if they simply use their name 
in a tweet, the athlete can see it.  Although some 
participants attributed this behavior to 
misguided fandom, the fact remains that 
student-athletes are still 18–22 years old, and 
the rate and content of critical tweets weighs 
heavily on these young minds.42 
 
Courts should evaluate a coach’s decision to limit their 
student-athletes’ use of social media in the proper context – 
where distractions and student welfare should dominate over 
fans desired access to athletes.  Coaches are hired to lead their 
athletes to victory in a healthy, fair and competitive manner.  
The question of student “rights” in the sports arena, including 
the right to expression, is far more limited than it is, and 
should be, in the classroom. 
 
IV. The First Amendment, Like All Amendments, Is Neither 
Literal Nor Absolute 
 
The First Amendment reads in pertinent part, “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”43 
If the First Amendment were literal, the question of 
whether a coach – who is most assuredly not “Congress” – could 
regulate their student-athlete’s speech would be easily 
resolved.  The plain language of the First Amendment speaks 
only to Congress, not to coaches or other public school 
employees.44  But, the First Amendment has been interpreted 
far more broadly than its originally-penned eighteenth century 
version.45  The First Amendment has been interpreted to apply 
 
42. Browning & Sanderson, supra note 10, at 517. 
43. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
44. Id. 
45. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes 
we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press — which are 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/2
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to any governmental actor, federal or state, who imposes 
regulations on an individual’s speech.  Thus, through judicial 
interpretation, the First Amendment has been found to apply 
to public school teachers and other state employees seeking to 
delimit a student’s speech.46 
What is often lost in First Amendment discussion, 
including when discussing social media usage, is the truism 
that, “the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to 
communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any 
manner that may be desired.”47 
Further, private regulation of speech does not implicate 
the First Amendment.  So, while the Athletic Department of 
Notre Dame – a private, Catholic university – is not bound by 
the First Amendment, Texas A&M University and other state 
institutions are.48  This is a vital starting place for any First 
Amendment discussion: no state actor, no First Amendment 
problem.49   
This article thus provides analysis for those state 
universities and colleges that seek to regulate their athletes’ 
social media usage.  When applying the First Amendment to 
state actors, and state universities, it is imperative to 
 
protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress — are 
among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the 
States.”). Gitlow, in 1925, marked the first time that the First Amendment 
was deemed “incorporated” to apply equally to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
46. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) 
(giving First Amendment scrutiny to school officials’ decision to omit two 
stories from a high school journalism paper); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 
U.S. 563 (1968) (applying First Amendment protections to school employees 
as state employees). 
47. Heffron v. Int’l Soc. For Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 
647 (1981). 
48. Hudgens v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) 
(reminding, “[i]t is, of course, a commonplace that the constitutional 
guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by 
government, federal or state.”). 
49. Id. “[W]hile statutory or common law may in some situations extend 
protection or provide redress against a private corporation or person who 
seeks to abridge the free expression of others, no such protection or redress is 
provided by the Constitution itself.” Id. 
25
  
2014 TINKERING WITH SUCCESS 53 
 
appreciate the First Amendment is not absolute.50  Even if we 
were to read the First Amendment as it is currently 
interpreted  to proclaim, “No state actor or employee, including 
college coaches and athletic departments shall make a rule . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech,” the Supreme Court’s current 
jurisprudence indicates that speech may indeed, at times, be 
abridged.51 
In fact, while the Supreme Court has proclaimed that 
students do not shed their First Amendment rights at the 
schoolhouse gate,52 it is clear that students’ free speech rights 
are not as robust as those of other adults.53  The Supreme 
Court permitted the potential leaking of national secrets to be 
printed in the Pentagon Papers case54 while simultaneously 
prohibiting a student paper from printing stories about divorce 
and teenage pregnancy.55  Politicians, or their surrogates, can 
use untoward language as they seek election but a high school 
student is prohibited from making a clever speech with sexual 
innuendos.56  An adult can walk in to a courthouse wearing 
 
50. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666. The Gitlow Court reminded,  
 
It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the 
freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the 
Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or 
publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or 
an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity 
for every possible use of language and prevents the 
punishment of those who abuse this freedom. 
 Id. 
51. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007) (upholding a student’s 
suspension for refusing to put down a banner reading “BONG Hits 4 JESUS” 
after the student was instructed to do so by school officials). 
52. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
53. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).  See also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their Rights at the Schoolhouse Gates: 
What’s Left of Tinker, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527 (2000). 
54. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
55. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) 
(upholding school’s decision to censor stories on teen pregnancy and divorce 
from school newspaper). The Supreme Court held “that educators do not 
offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and 
content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as 
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Id. 
56. See Bethel, 478 U.S. at 682 (recognizing that the First Amendment 
rights of public school students “are not automatically coextensive with the 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/2
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clothing that urges readers to “Fuck the Draft,”57 while a high 
school student can be disciplined for wearing an American flag 
on Cinco de Mayo.58  Religious activists can protest and hold 
signs at a military veteran’s funeral that proclaim “God Hates 
Fags” for the world to see,59 but a high school student can be 
suspended for holding a sign that says “Bong Hits 4 Jesus.”60 
Students may not “shed their First Amendment rights at 
the schoolhouse gate,” but they definitely do not have the same 
level of First Amendment protections as their parents or other 
adults.  The Supreme Court has found that speech rights at 
schools may be restricted based on the special learning-based 
environment of a school.61  But, these cases, particularly the 
seminal cases, focus on primary and secondary education not 
colleges.62  Hence, the precedential value of these cases may be 
somewhat diminished in the college setting. 
Most commentators writing on the issue of college athletes’ 
social media usage rely on Tinker v. Des Moines to establish 
that regulations can only be imposed on college students if 
there is proof that a substantial, material disruption of the 
classroom is implicated.  This reliance is misplaced on two 
levels. 
First, Tinker is a high school case, not a college case.  And, 
I firmly believe that college students are qualitatively different, 
for First Amendment purposes, from high school students.63  
Protests are common on college campuses, ranging from sit-ins 
 
rights of adults in other settings.”). 
57. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971). 
58. Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 745 F.3d 354 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
59. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011). 
60. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
61. Hazelwood Sch Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1988). 
62. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 393; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273; Bethel Sch. 
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 506 (1969). 
63. See, e.g., Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667 
(1973) (overturning, on First Amendment grounds, a journalism student’s 
expulsion from the University for publishing a newspaper with a political 
cartoon of a police officer raping the Statute of Liberty and Lady Justice and 
for printing a story titled “Mother Fucker Acquitted” detailing the assault 
trial of a New York Youth who was a member of the organization “Up Against 
the Wall Mother Fucker.”). 
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to rows and rows of crosses marking anti-abortion protests or 
yellow ribbons to honor our military personnel or other political 
demonstrations.  Our nation’s colleges represent the 
quintessential marketplace of ideas.64  But, a college campus or 
college classroom is not the same as a college arena or college 
football field. 
Second, while most other authors attempt to place the 
social media usage regulations under the Tinker paradigm, 
such paradigm focuses on academic issues, not athletic issues.  
Tinker’s “material disruption” standard is ill-equipped to aid 
courts in determining whether a particular form of speech or 
expression might prove counterproductive to athletic 
performance.  Tinker focuses on the school’s academic setting, 
not a campus’s athletic setting.  Thus, I strongly believe that 
any reliance on Tinker misses the key distinction between the 
student-athlete as student and the student-athlete as athlete.  
While Tinker might be applicable in the college setting, an 
extension I am loath to embrace, Tinker nonetheless cannot 
possibly apply to an athletic setting where the goal is 
successful athletic performance not traditional academic 
instruction. 
A better analytical model comes either from cases 
involving military personnel65 or the Supreme Court’s content-
neutral time, place and manner line of cases.66  Under either 
approach, the speech rights of athletes are more properly 
cabined within the greater athletic framework emphasizing 
team over individual.  Because I have addressed, albeit it 
briefly, application of the military personnel analogy in a 
previous writing,67 I will focus solely on the time, place and 
 
64. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972) (noting at the 
outset, “that state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from 
the sweep of the First Amendment” and further confirming that “the college 
classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the “‘marketplace of 
ideas,’” and we break no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this 
Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom.”). 
65. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); Parker v. Levy, 417 
U.S. 733 (1974). 
66. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994); Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
67. Mary Margaret Penrose, Free Speech Versus Free Education:  First 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/2
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manner cases in this article. 
Chief Justice Hughes first coined the phrase “time, place 
and manner” in Cox v. New Hampshire in 1941.68  Since then, 
numerous Supreme Court cases have held that content-neutral 
speech regulations that primarily restrict the time, place and 
manner of expression, not the expression itself, are 
constitutional.  The First Amendment does not prohibit 
limiting the location69 or volume70 of speech and expressive 
activity.71  Instead, as noted in Clark v. Community for 
Creative Non-Violence: 
 
Expression, whether oral or written or 
symbolized by conduct is subject to reasonable 
time, place, or manner restrictions. We have 
often noted that restrictions of this kind are valid 
provided they are justified without reference to 
the content of the regulated speech, they are 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest, and that they leave open 
ample alternative channels for communication of 
the information.72 
 
The key in all time, place and manner cases is the 
requirement that the speech or expressive activity being 
regulated be content-neutral,73 which ensures a regulation is 
 
Amendment Considerations in Limiting Student Athlete’s Use of Social 
Media, 1 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 71 (2012). 
68. Cox, 312 U.S. at 569. 
69. Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding an ordinance 
prohibiting picketing in front of specific residential properties); Clark, 468 
U.S. at 288 (1984) (upholding a content-neutral regulation forbidding 
individuals from sleeping in symbolic tents on the National Mall and at 
Lafayette Park during a demonstration to generate attention for the plight of 
the homeless); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
70. Ward, 491 U.S. at 781; Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); 
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
71. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (upholding 
both a 30 foot protest buffer zone and an excessive noise restriction). 
72. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (citations omitted). 
73. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc. For Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 
640 (1981). “A major criterion for a valid time, place, and manner restriction 
29
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“not being applied because of disagreement with the message 
presented.”74  Content-neutrality requires regulation that is 
trans-substantive, or that applies to all speakers regardless of 
the subject or message being conveyed.75  In Police Department 
of Chicago v. Mosley, the Supreme Court struck down an 
ordinance prohibiting most picketing outside a school but 
excepting peaceful picketing of a school involved in a labor 
dispute because “[t]he. . .ordinance. . .describes permissible 
picketing in terms of its subject matter.  Peaceful picketing on 
the subject of a school’s labor-management dispute is 
permitted, but all other peaceful picketing is prohibited.”76  As 
Justice Marshall admonished, “. . .above all else, the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter 
or its content.”77  When regulation targets particular 
expression because of its message, content or subject matter, 
the regulation is not content-neutral.78 
Case law suggests the delineation of three requirements to 
constitutionally satisfy the time, place and manner doctrine: (1) 
content-neutral regulation; (2) that is narrowly tailored to 
 
is that the restriction ‘may not be based upon either the content or subject 
matter of speech.’” Id. at 648 (citation omitted). 
74. Clark, 468 U.S. at 295. 
75. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 93 (1972) 
(striking down ordinance that prohibited all picketing within 150 feet of a 
school when school is in session except “peaceful picketing of any school 
involved in a labor dispute.”). 
76. Id. at 95. 
77. Id. (citations omitted). 
78. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).  The Court 
reminds:  
 
The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in 
speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases 
in particular, is whether the government has adopted a 
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the 
message it conveys. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 
supra, at 295. The government's purpose is the controlling 
consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated 
to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has 
an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not 
others. 
 Id. 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/2
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serve a significant government interest; and, (3) leaves ample 
channels of communication open to the speaker. The regulation 
need not be the least restrictive possible, but merely must 
satisfy the tripartite test announced in Clark v. Community for 
Creative Non-Violence.79  In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the 
Supreme Court explained that time, place and manner 
regulations are not analyzed to see if they provided the best fit, 
constitutionally speaking, but are assessed only to ensure they 
satisfy Clark and its progeny.80  Reviewing courts need not 
evaluate time, place and manner regulations to ensure they are 
the “least intrusive means of furthering [a] legitimate 
governmental interest.”81  Rather, the question is simply 
whether a particular regulation satisfies Clark’s three-part test 
of content-neutrality, whether the regulation is narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant government interest and whether 
it leaves alternative channels of communication open to the 
speaker.82 
One of the better case presentations analyzing Clark’s 
three-part formula occurs in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.83  
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, separates each of the 
three elements for discussion into distinct sections.84  In doing 
so, Justice Kennedy provides a clear roadmap for legislatures 
and litigants alike to evaluate the constitutionality of speech 
regulations.  This roadmap convinces this author that 
reviewing courts will likely find coaches and athletic 
departments’ regulation of their athletes’ social media accounts 
constitutional. 
 
A. Content Neutrality 
 
 
79. Id. at 789-90 (reversing Second Circuit opinion because it 
erroneously required “the city to prove that its regulation was the least 
intrusive means of furthering its legitimate governmental interests. . . .”). 
80. Id. at 791. 
81. Id. at 789-90. 
82. Id. at 791 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 
288 (1984); Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 
(1981)). 
83. Id. at 791-803. 
84. Id. 
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Unlike many scholars in this area, this author believes 
that the season-long wholesale ban is far more likely to satisfy 
First Amendment scrutiny than those regulations that target 
particular words, phrases or topics.  The season-long bans, 
those regulations requiring athletes to sign off of their Twitter 
or Facebook accounts during their competitive season, are 
content-neutral.  NO communications may be posted, 
regardless of content.  NO messages may be sent, regardless of 
topic.  A ban, while seemingly more oppressive than a simple 
listing and policing of the prohibited “seven dirty words,”85 
never considers the propriety or acceptability of the speech.86  
All speech is equally prohibited regardless of whether it 
involves self-promotion, sexually graphic materials, cursing, 
injury updates, team strategies or devotions.  A ban, by its very 
nature, is content-neutral.87 
In contrast, once the state begins choosing acceptable 
verbiage or expression, reviewing courts will ordinarily review 
such regulations under the highest, most arduous form of 
constitutional review, strict scrutiny.  As the Supreme Court 
reminded in Cohen v. California: 
 
[T]he principle [of restricting offensive 
 
85. Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (memorializing 
comedian George Carlin’s monologue the seven words you could not say on 
the airways: “shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker and tits”).  Two 
other authors participating in this Symposium have listed several words that 
are prohibited by universities and colleges when their athletes participate in 
social media dialogue.  Ironically, once the state chooses a particular word, 
i.e. “fuck,” or a particularly category, i.e. “curse words,” the state is engaging 
in content-based prohibitions that receive the highest level and most 
searching from of constitutional scrutiny from courts.  These “seven dirty 
words” prohibitions are far more likely to be found unconstitutional than an 
outright ban moderated by time, place and manner regulations. 
86. See, e.g., Jimmy Sanderson, To Tweet or Not to Tweet: Exploring 
Division I Athletic Departments’ Social-Media Policies, 4 INT’L J. SPORTS 
COMM. 492, 500-02 (2011).  
87. See City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 
(1984) (“For there is not even a hint of bias or censorship in the City's 
enactment or enforcement of this ordinance. There is no claim that the 
ordinance was designed to suppress certain ideas that the City finds 
distasteful or that it has been applied to appellees because of the views that 
they express. The text of the ordinance is neutral — indeed it is silent — 
concerning any speaker's point of view . . . .”). 
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/2
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words] contended for by the State seems 
inherently boundless.  How is one to distinguish 
[these words] from any other offensive word?  
Surely the State has no right to cleanse public 
debate to the point where it is grammatically 
palatable to the most squeamish among us.  Yet 
no readily ascertainable general principle exists 
for stopping short of that result were we to affirm 
the judgment below. For, while the particular 
four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps 
more distasteful than most others of its genre, it 
is nevertheless true that one man’s vulgarity is 
another’s lyric.88 
 
Cohen required the state to provide a “compelling” reason 
to prohibit an individual from wearing a jacket bearing the 
phrase “Fuck the Draft.”89  Legislation need only satisfy a 
“compelling” governmental interest when the Court invokes its 
highest level of constitutional review, strict scrutiny.  Strict 
scrutiny generally results in a regulation being struck down 
because unlike time, place and manner restrictions, strict 
scrutiny requires proof that the regulation leaves no less 
restrictive means available to accomplish the government 
interest.90  As set forth above, the “no less restrictive means” 
test does not apply in a time, place and manner evaluation. 
Thus, while many scholars celebrate schools’ use of 
prohibited words and call for educating student-athletes as to 
“appropriate” behavior on social media, such content-based 
approach strikes at the heart of the First Amendment.  
Instead, using a time, place and manner analysis, the far more 
likely constitutionally permissible approach is a content-
neutral season long ban.  No one is on social media during the 
season . . . period. 
 
88. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). 
89. Id. at 16, 26. “[A]bsent a more particularized and compelling reason 
for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, make the simple public display here involved of this single 
four-letter expletive a criminal offense.” Id. at 26. 
90. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789-90, 797-99 (1989). 
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Using Justice Kennedy’s paradigm in Ward, a state 
university’s main reason for imposing a season-long ban during 
an athlete’s competitive season is to ensure that the athlete 
remains focused on successful athletic performance.91  Much 
like the volume and noise complaints at issue in Ward, “[t]his 
justification for the guideline ‘ha[s] nothing to do with content,’ 
and it satisfies the requirement that time, place, or manner 
regulations be content-neutral.”92  State universities imposing 
season-long bans do not delimit what words, what subjects, or 
what topics are permissible.  The universities, or their coaches 
and athletic departments, are limiting wholesale distractions, 
not just phrases or themes.  Instead, in order to maintain the 
team and athletes’ focus on the primary activity of athletic 
competition, social media is proscribed during the competitive 
season. 
 
 
 
 
B. Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government 
Interest 
 
Once a regulation satisfies the content-neutral 
requirement, there must be a demonstration of a narrow 
tailoring (or fit) to serve a significant governmental interest.93  
This really requires two assessments – the first being some 
effort to properly tailor or shape the regulation so as to not 
overly impact speech and, second, proof of a significant 
governmental interest. 
In the athletic context, as set forth above, the significant 
government interest is to focus on the goal of athletics: 
successful athletic performance.  Universities field athletic 
teams to promote competition and athletic success.  Thus, it 
appears that keeping 18- to 23-year-old student-athletes 
focused on the task at hand, their athletic contests, would 
 
91. Id. at 792. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 796. 
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satisfy the significant governmental interest.  This would be 
particularly true for those student-athletes receiving athletic 
scholarships.  Those on athletic scholarships are literally being 
given governmental resources (money) in exchange for focusing 
at least part of their attention on contributing their time and 
effort to successful athletic performance. 
All student-athletes, however, are government supported 
individuals, as even those not on athletic scholarship receive 
the benefit of travel, tutors, enhanced training and medical 
care, athletic instruction, clothing, equipment and other 
athletic gear.  The student-athlete, while not likely a state 
employee, nonetheless is an individual representing the 
university.94  And, these individuals are tasked with furthering 
the state interest in fielding a successful athletic team on 
behalf of the university.  The university, accordingly, should be 
permitted to justify their action based on the significant 
government interest of encouraging successful athletic 
performance. 
The governmental interest upheld in Ward was protecting 
citizens and visitors to Central Park from unwelcome noise.95  
Here, the governmental interest is keeping athletes focused on 
athletics, competition and performance.  While this interest 
may sound trite, states benefit from fielding successful athletic 
teams.96  State universities with efficacious athletic programs 
often see their national academic ranking heightened, their 
applications increase, their admissions become more 
competitive and their alumni support increased.97  More 
 
94. Cf. Marcum v. Dahl, 658 F.2d 731, 734-35 (10th Cir. 1981). 
95. Ward, 491 U.S. at 796. 
96. Michael L. Anderson, The Benefits of College Athletic Success:  An 
Application of the Propensity Score Design with Instrumental Variables 3 
(Natl. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18196, 2012), available 
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18196 (finding “robust evidence that football 
success increases athletic donations, increases the number of applicants, 
lowers a school’s acceptance rate, increases enrollment of in-state students, 
increases the average SAT score of incoming classes, and enhances a school’s 
academic reputation.”). 
97. Id. at 24.  These gains are not merely “reputational” but also directly 
impact the university and its educational mission.  Professor Anderson found:  
 
For FBS schools, winning football games increases alumni 
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attention from athletic prowess, both in the nature of academic 
ranking and with alumni, tends to mean more community 
support – be it financial or otherwise, localized or national.  
More support lends itself to furthering the broader university 
mission of educating the state’s citizenry.  Thus, athletics, 
ultimately further the state’s interest in education. 
Once a significant government interest is demonstrated, 
“the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the 
. . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that 
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.’”98  
State universities will be put to the test that without the 
regulation, or season-long social media ban, keeping a team 
focused on athletic performance is more difficult.  This does not 
require empirical evidence or identical treatment of every 
program.  It is not a “but-for” or “least restrictive means” test.99  
Rather, courts tend to give deference to state actors to deal 
with a problem (team and individual distractions) with 
sufficient latitude to determine whether there is a need to act 
and, if so, to assess those actions for reasonable fit, not 
absolute precision.100 
 
athletic donations, enhances a school’s academic reputation, 
increases the number of applicants and in-state students, 
reduces acceptance rates, and raises average incoming SAT 
scores. The estimates imply that large increases in team 
performance can have economically significant effects, 
particularly in the area of athletic donations. Consider a 
school that improves its season wins by 5 games (the 
approximate difference between a 25th percentile season 
and a 75th percentile season). Changes of this magnitude 
occur approximately 8% of the time over a one-year period 
and 13% of the time over a two-year period. This school may 
expect alumni athletic donations to increase by $682,000 
(28%), applications to increase by 677 (5%), the acceptance 
rate to drop by 1.5 percentage points (2%), in-state 
enrollment to increase by 76 students (3%), and incoming 
25th percentile SAT scores to increase by 9 points (1%). 
Id. 
98. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799. 
99. Id. at 798 (“Lest any confusion on the point remain, we reaffirm 
today that a regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must 
be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral 
interests but that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means 
of doing so.”). 
100. Id. at 799-800. 
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To be sure, this standard does not mean that a 
time, place, or manner regulation may burden 
substantially more speech than is necessary to 
further the government’s legitimate interests. 
Government may not regulate expression in such 
a manner that a substantial portion of the 
burden on speech does not serve to advance its 
goals.  See Frisby  v. Schultz, 487 U. S., at 485 
(“A complete ban can be narrowly tailored but 
only if each activity within the proscription’s 
scope is an appropriately targeted evil”). So long 
as the means chosen are not substantially 
broader than necessary to achieve the 
government’s interest, however, the regulation 
will not be invalid simply because a court 
concludes that the government’s interest could be 
adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive 
alternative. “The validity of [time, place, or 
manner] regulations does not turn on a judge’s 
agreement with the responsible decision maker 
concerning the most appropriate method for 
promoting significant government interests” or 
the degree to which those interests should be 
promoted. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. at 
689; see Community for Creative Non-Violence, 
supra, at 299.101 
 
Thus, a complete ban – particularly when that ban is 
temporarily imposed to apply only during the competitive 
season – should pass constitutional scrutiny.  The reason that a 
ban, as opposed to a more limited regulation targeting words or 
actions, is necessary is two-fold: first, states may not pick and 
choose proper discourse, words or conduct, without violating 
the requirement of content-neutrality, and, second, only in 
eradicating, entirely, the distractions posed by social media will 
a team and its athletes be able to keep their focus on the court 
 
101. Id. 
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or the field.  Social media presents a significant distraction 
from successful athletic performance and a temporary ban 
during the competitive season provides a constitutionally 
effective way to curtail the distraction. 
As the Supreme Court found in Frisby v. Schultz: 
 
A statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and 
eliminates no more than the exact source of the 
“evil” it seeks to remedy. City Council of Los 
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 
808-810, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2130-2132, 80 L.Ed.2d 
772 (1984). A complete ban can be narrowly 
tailored, but only if each activity within the 
proscription’s scope is an appropriately targeted 
evil. For example, in Taxpayers for Vincent we 
upheld an ordinance that banned all signs on 
public property because the interest supporting 
the regulation, an esthetic interest in avoiding 
visual clutter and blight, rendered each sign an 
evil. Complete prohibition was necessary because 
“the substantive evil — visual blight — [was] not 
merely a possible byproduct of the activity, but 
[was] created by the medium of expression itself.” 
Id., at 810, 104 S. Ct. at 2131.102 
 
Imposing social media bans on student-athletes assures 
that the athletes will not be improperly distracted, consumed 
with virtual “socializing,” perpetually updating their status or 
otherwise influenced in a manner that undermines team unity 
and athletic performance.  The “evil” to be remedied is 
distraction from “friends” and “followers” that undermine 
teamwork and team performance.  Social media usage presents 
a broad and pervasive problem, much like visual clutter and 
blight.  Constitutionally, athletic departments are prohibited 
from picking and choosing the messages or friends that an 
athlete may communicate with but they are within their 
constitutional power to delimit an athlete’s time spent on social 
 
102. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1988). 
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media just as they are permitted to control their athletes’ 
behavior through curfews and other team-imposed rules.  
Nearly identical to the situation in City Council of Los Angeles 
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, athletic departments are prohibited 
from giving support to particular messages or viewpoints 
without undermining the distraction posed by all social 
media.103 
Social media bans are analogous to the noise control issues 
facing the Court in Ward.  There, Justice Kennedy observed: 
 
It is undeniable that the city’s substantial 
interest in limiting sound volume is served in a 
direct and effective way by the requirement that 
the city’s sound technician control the mixing 
board during performances. Absent this 
requirement, the city’s interest would have been 
served less well, as is evidenced by the 
complaints about excessive volume generated by 
respondent’s past concerts. The alternative 
regulatory methods hypothesized by the Court of 
Appeals reflect nothing more than a 
disagreement with the city over how much 
control of volume is appropriate or how that level 
of control is to be achieved. See Community for 
Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 299. The Court 
of Appeals erred in failing to defer to the city’s 
reasonable determination that its interest in 
controlling volume would be best served by 
requiring bandshell performers to utilize the 
city’s sound technician.104 
 
To compare Ward to an athletic department’s regulation of 
its student-athletes would read as follows: It is undeniable that 
a university’s interest in keeping athletes focused on their 
athletic contests is served in a direct and effective way by 
banning their use of social media during the competitive 
 
103. City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 
(1984). 
104. Ward, 491 U.S. at 800. 
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season.  Absent this requirement, athletes are likely to be 
distracted by continually focusing on social media, checking 
and updating their profiles, communicating with fans and 
critics alike, and dealing with criticism of their play that could 
impact team chemistry or their own individual confidence and 
performance.  The alternative methods proffered by those 
desiring greater access to, or perhaps for, student-athletes is 
nothing but second guessing of a coach or athletic department’s 
assessment of team chemistry and student welfare.  Season-
long bans generally last three to five months and ensure that a 
student-athlete keeps their focus on why they are part of an 
athletic team and department: to successfully represent the 
institution in athletic contests. 
 
C. Alternative Channels of Communication Remain Open 
 
The final requirement under time, place and manner 
analysis is that alternative channels of communication remain 
open.105  The reported bans of social media have focused on 
Twitter, Facebook and other social media outlets that 
encourage virtual “friends” and “followers.” These virtual 
worlds, a modern invention, help disseminate communications 
– they are not communications in any intrinsic manner.  Most 
of the twentieth century witnessed interaction between 
athletes and true friends and followers using email, cellphones, 
text messaging and other traditional methods of 
communication.  Modern technology has perhaps curbed these 
traditional forms of communication for our youth, but direct 
communication is far from passé and provides protections that 
virtual communications do not.  Chief among the distinctions 
between direct and virtual communications is that direct 
communication requires a person to actually communicate 
precisely – with a known number, address or person – versus 
sending an indirect communication out to a virtual world 
where the recipient may be known or unknown. 
The critical feature of a season-long social media ban is 
that these bans still permit “the more general dissemination of 
 
105. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483. 
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a message.”106 Student-athletes are not prohibited from 
communicating with individuals – even fans – under the 
current social media proscriptions.  There are many, many 
methods for these individuals to continue speaking and 
expressing themselves in a myriad of ways outside social 
media.  Athletes may call individuals.  They may appear at 
press conferences to self-promote or further showcase their 
talents.  They may use email or text-messaging.  Many benefit 
from television exposure.  They may even use placards or signs 
or billboards.  The current social media bans merely foreclose, 
for a short period, one technique of communication but do not 
preclude the dissemination of messages generally. 
The advantage of direct communication or direct media 
over social media is that individuals relying on direct media 
can be more sure of who they are actually communicating with.  
Further, direct communication makes if far more likely that a 
student-athlete will limit their time and exposure with direct 
media, eliminating a key component of the distractions coaches 
seek to eliminate.  Social media, as two professors note, is 
empirically demonstrated to capture far more of an individual’s 
time than telephone calls or other communication 
techniques.107  If coaches must deal with athletes that are 
reflexively, if not obsessively, checking their social media 
status for updates via their cellphones throughout team 
meetings, team meals, practices, team travel and even games, 
there is a high likelihood for distraction coupled with a 
lessened opportunity to develop proper team chemistry. 
Direct communication requires focus and direction, i.e. 
dialing a particular number, texting a particular person or 
writing to a particular email address.  For student-athletes, a 
world without constant social media updates would require 
talking to your teammates, focusing on school during study hall 
and eliminating the divisive nature of competing for virtual 
 
106. Id. 
107. See Browning & Sanderson, supra note 10, at 509 (“Participants 
reported checking Twitter frequently throughout the day, ranging from 20 to 
hundreds of times each day.”). If students are obsessed with their social 
media presence, chances are likely they are less “present” for other activities, 
not the least of which includes all team and sport activities required from the 
student athlete. 
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“friends” and “followers.”  Unlike social media, to reach 
hundreds or thousands of individuals at once, a person using 
direct communication would have to make hundreds of phone 
calls or send hundreds of emails.  Direct communication, by its 
very nature, limits the potential distraction and audience.  But, 
in no way does requiring direct communication eliminate, or 
even lessen, the message. 
In contrast, social media can be all-consuming and 
distracting, opening individuals up to communications from 
individuals posing as “friends” and “followers” whose main goal 
– particularly with student-athletes – is to harass, harangue, 
stalk or befriend individuals who they would otherwise never 
have contact with.  Social media allows an individual to send 
something out into a virtual world that can literally reach 
thousands of people simultaneously, with those people being 
known or unknown, in fact potentially unknowable, by the 
sender.  Social media poses a much higher risk to student-
welfare based on the fact that student-athletes are highly 
visible, highly impressionable and extremely vulnerable to fans 
and critics’ postings.  Finally, because students can become 
obsessed with watching their social media profiles grow and 
proliferate, social media is highly distracting, particularly for 
the young athlete that seeks self-promotion and attention. 
Provided athletic departments do not foreclose direct 
communications, particularly those with known friends and 
family members such as text messaging, cellphones, Facetime 
and other forms of general communication, the season-long 
bans proscribing Twitter and Facebook should satisfy the final 
time, place and manner requirement.108  The risk posed by 
social media is largely due to the unknown audience and 
unknown “friends” and “followers” that begin to communicate 
with the student-athlete.  These communications are 
qualitatively distinct from direct communications with actual 
friends and known acquaintances. 
Coaches that impose season-long bans are not shutting 
down an athlete’s ability to communicate with his or her larger 
 
108. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483-84. 
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audience.109  Instead, the coach is taking steps to ensure that 
the student-athlete is protected from the mischiefs attendant to 
social media, the harassment endured by many college athletes 
on social media and the high level of distraction that these self-
focused forms of communication entail.  Coaches have valid 
reasons for wanting to keep their athletes’ mind focused on the 
court or field rather than the number of “friends” and 
“followers” they have assembled.  Coaches have similarly 
appropriate reasons to keep their athletes focused on team 
rather than individual. 
Time, place and manner regulations merely require that 
ample channels of communication remain open to the speaker.  
Leaving ample channels open does not require identical 
channels remain open.110  The key in time, place and manner, 
is to ensure that a speaker can still spread his or her message – 
not that the volume, impact or audience for the speaker remain 
the same.  For these reasons, season-long bans that permit 
direct communications will likely pass constitutional muster. 
 
V. Coaches Can Constitutionally Admonish Their Athletes, 
“Shut It Off and Play” 
 
Fans want unfettered access to their favorite players.  I 
understand this.  I fully appreciate this.  But, wanting to learn 
what our favorite athletes are doing, thinking or having the 
ability to send them notes of support or criticism is not 
something that is constitutionally mandated.  Rather, coaches 
retain the right to regulate their athletes’ usage of social media 
under proper content-neutral time, place and manner 
restrictions.  Prohibiting an athlete from using Facebook does 
not preclude them from sending a text message to a friend or 
relative or a known fan.  Proscribing an athlete from utilizing 
Twitter during the season, pre-season or any time before or 
after competition does not exclude them from calling 
individuals to discuss their performance or lament a tough loss.  
In each instance where social media usage has been foreclosed, 
 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
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other options for communication – often options that require 
some familiarity with the individual – remain available to the 
athlete.  What these policies tend to limit are simply the 
communications that get sent everywhere, to everyone that 
remain forever available on the internet to haunt a player and 
his or her university and athletic department.  Rather than 
exist in a virtual world where someone may never meet their 
“friends” and “followers,” coaches retain the power to limit 
their players’ interactions to known individuals.  Players live in 
a world that is hypersensitive and hypercritical to the athlete’s 
every move and coaches retain the power to limit those 
interactions.  The First Amendment poses no impediment. 
The coach’s non-speech reasoning for such regulations is 
simple: successful athletic performance.  The goal of athletics is 
to win.  Coaches owe their players and the colleges for which 
they coach the duty to field the most competitive team they can 
ethically and athletically field.  If a coach were to regulate 
speech and advise a player to “shut it off”, that might be a 
speech-based regulation.  But, even in those instances where it 
appears the coach is striving to limit the information their 
athletes post or tweet, the reality is that the coach is seeking to 
minimize distractions to athletic performance, not regulate the 
content of their athletes’ speech.  It is not that coaches want 
their athletes not to talk.  Rather, the truth remains that 
coaches want, actually need, their athletes to focus – focus on 
team, focus on performance and focus on winning. 
Supreme Court precedent permits reasonable time, place 
and manner regulations provided those regulations are 
content-neutral (here, the regulations are generally complete 
bans from certain, but not all, social media formats), not 
intended to curtail speech or expression (here, the goal is on 
improving athletic performance) and retain other comparative 
avenues for speech or expression (here, cell phones, email and 
other social media with known users).  The current regulations 
imposed by some Division I coaches appear to be 
constitutionally acceptable.  These regulations aid coaches in 
protecting their athletes from outside distractions and 
unknown detractors whose communications can impact athletic 
performance and outcome. 
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But, good law does not always make good policy.  The fact 
that coaches, athletic departments and colleges may legally be 
entitled to regulate their student athletes’ social media usage 
does not automatically suggest they should.  We live in a 
decidedly modern world where 24/7 news and entertainment 
access shapes our cultural experience.  This author believes 
that each coach, each athletic program has the legal authority 
to choose for itself and its athletes the best course regarding 
social media.  What may be good for Texas A&M may not work 
as well at Kansas.  And, under existing First Amendment 
precedent it appears that the best course is to be charted 
individually by each school.  Social media regulations 
absolutely implicate the First Amendment.  But, as 
demonstrated above, implicating the First Amendment is not 
the same as violating the First Amendment.  Despite fans’ 
desire to have unfettered access to their favorite college 
athletes via social media, such access is not constitutionally 
mandated.  Successful athletic performance, not social 
interaction with “friends” and “followers,” is the goal of 
athletics.  My belief, my hope, is that the courts will both 
recognize and support this goal in line with past precedent. 
The First Amendment literally permits coaches to instruct 
their athletes to “shut it off and play.”  Whether they choose to 
do so is an entirely different matter that, like so many other 
choices, is best decided between coach and player.111 
 
111. A great example of how the issue of banning or permitting Twitter 
remains a policy decision is the decision by Coach Chris Peterson, the new 
University of Washington head football coach, to allow his football players at 
UW to use social media despite having been one of the first college coaches to 
ban social media while at Boise State.  Taylor Soper, New UW Football Coach 
Lifts Twitter Ban for Players, GEEKWIRE (Apr. 19, 2014), 
http://www.geekwire.com/2014/chris-petersen-huskies-social-media/. 
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